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Malcolm Gillis*

Evolution of Natural Resource
Taxation in Developing Countries

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the long-term evolution of objectives and instruments of taxation of non-renewable natural resource endowments in a
wide spectrum of developing countries other than Mid-East oil exporters.
Resources in energy (oil, coal and uranium) and non-fuel minerals such
as tin, nickel and copper, as well as tropical natural forest stands receive
particular emphasis. Inclusion of tropical timber in a taxonomy of nonrenewable resources is not usual, but is entirely justified. The long growing cycles (40-120 years) for most species of commercial logs harvested
from the natural tropical forests of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the
fragile ecology of the tropical forest, and the widespread lack of success
in inducing regeneration of harvested species, have led forest specialists
to classify the resource as either non-renewable, or semi-renewable at
best.'
Two decades ago, articles dealing with natural resource taxation in less
developed countries (LDCs) were, perforce, largely confined to discussions of the implications of only two forms of fiscal exactions, royalties
and corporate income taxes. 2 These articles ordinarily considered the
levying of such exactions within the context of traditional concession
contracts upon one type of enterprise: private sector transnational corporations (TNCs) from developed countries, primarily the United States.
The literature of that period explored a recurrent theme: the view that
LDC host countries with attractive natural resource endowments were,
',,wing to a lack of bargaining skills and technical know-how, at a marked
disadvantage in dealing with transnational corporations. As a result, there
was a general perception, certainly within LDCs, that the provisions of
*Institute Fellow, Harvard Institute for International Development, and Lecturer in Economics,
Department of Economics, Harvard University.
1. See, e.g. Gomez-Pompa, Guevara, and Yanes, The Tropical Rain Forest, A Non-Renewable
Resource, 177 SCIENCE 762-765 (1972). See also: U.S. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
TROPICAL FORESTS, THE WORLD'S TROPICAL FORESTS (1980).
2. See, e.g. Baklanoff, Taxation of United States-Owned Copper Companies In Chile: Economic
Myopia vs. Long-Run Self Interest, 14 NAT'L TAX J. 81, 84 (1961) and Penrose, Middle East Oil:
The InternationalDistribution of Profits and Income Taxes, 27 ECONOMICA 203, 212 (1960).
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many natural resource agreements, particularly those pertaining to taxes,
were skewed in favor of foreign firms. 3
By 1980, the patterns of host country taxes and natural resource investors bore little resemblance to those prevailing in 1960, or even to those
of the late sixties. Fundamental changes have taken place in the mix of
fiscal instruments employed by host countries for exacting a larger share
of rents from their natural resource sectors. 4 Further, both host country
capacities for effectively capturing natural resource rents and the nature
of the enterprises engaged in extractive activity in LDCs have fundamentally changed. The pace of changes in taxation has not by any means
been uniform across all types of natural resources. The changes have
been most rapid in the case of oil, slowest in the case of uranium, gradual
but steady in hard minerals, and non-existent in tropical timber until
1978-79, when tax measures adopted by major producing countries effected quantum, rather than evolutionary, changes. Within different categories of natural resources, however, there is some evidence of the
operation, on an international scale, of something resembling a "tax
demonstration effect." For example, innovations in taxation of oil in one
group of countries appears to lead, with only short lags, to similar changes
in oil and even coal taxes in other LDCs, but not in taxes on uranium,
another energy resource. Change in one country's tax treatment on copper
seems to be quickly recognized and applied elsewhere not only in copper
taxes but in the taxation of other non-fuel minerals. In some cases, the
"demonstration effect" appears to operate more strongly on a regional,
but not worldwide scale, as in tropical timber. Major adjustments in
Indonesian and Malaysian taxes on timber, for example, apparently have
induced no changes at all in West African or Latin American timber taxes.
The remainder of this section sketches the broad outlines of changes in
taxation and identities of investors.
A. Overview of Tax Instruments: Breakthroughs and Sneakthroughs
In the early sixties, host country governments tended to rely heavily
upon a mix of specific royalties and generally applicable income taxes
3. Prior to 1970, there were few published examples of systematic studies of natural resources
taxes in particular developing countries much less across countries. Some of these are summarized
in chapter 2 of R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF
U.S. ENTERPRISES (1971). In general, the literature depicting the experiences of the fifties and
early sixties by and large stresses a skewing of the benefits (including tax benefits) from LDC
minerals projects against host countries, stressing the bargaining advantages of multinational enterprises over host developing countries. This perspective is particularly well expressed in D. SMITH
& L. WELLS, NEGOTIATING THIRD WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS 1-3 (1975).
4. An "economic rent" is generally defined as a scarcity return to a factor production in excess
of what that factor would earn in its next best alternative use. Rent, whether in natural resource
extraction or in any other activity, represents surplus value accruing to any factor of production in
inelastic supply.
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on natural resource operations. These governments set both taxes at low
rates (sometimes zero rates where income taxes were concerned) relative
to those now prevailing. The reliance on royalties and general income
taxes has greatly diminished. In the past two decades, LDC governments
have proliferated an array of new tax and tax-like instruments for rent
appropriation. 5 Both breakthroughs and also what might be termed
"sneakthroughs" have occurred. The widespread adoption of windfall
profits taxes and windfall royalty systems in LDC natural resource sectors
in the decade after 1970, well before similar devices were enacted in the
United States, Norway and Britain, provides perhaps the most significant
example of a real breakthrough. By 1980, many LDCs had enacted windfall profits, or excess profits taxes, on the extraction of all types of
resources save tropical timber, including copper (Zambia in 1970,6 Papua
New Guinea in 19747), other non-fuel minerals (Indonesia in 19778),
uranium (Colombia in 19779), oil (Papua New Guinea in 1976"0), and
coal (Colombia in 1976"). In a closely related set of developments,
windfall royalties, or adjustable royalties geared to resource prices, were
adopted for Malaysian oil in 1976, Sabah tropical timber in 1979, and
Peruvian oil in 1980. In all these cases, the investor pays a proportionally
higher (as in oil in Malaysia and Peru) or progressively higher (as in
Malaysian tin) additional royalty when prices exceed some base price
established by the government.
The development of such tax-like methods for rent capture as "free
equity" for host country governments in minerals projects presents another
5. A substantial amount of comparative information is presented in this paper. Much of the
information is drawn from published and forthcoming articles by the author and collaborators, together
with the sources which follow. Non-fuel minerals: M. GILLIS et al., TAXATION AND MINING:
NON-FUEL MINERALS IN BOLIVIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES, Ch. 5 (1978); M. GILLIS &
R. BEALS, TAX AND INVESTMENT POLICY TOWARD HARD MINERALS, Ch. 7 (1980); L.
WELLS & D. SMITH, NEGOTIATING THIRD WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS, Ch. 4
(1975); Energy resources: M. GILLIS & R. BEALS, TAX AND INVESTMENT POLICY TOWARD
HARD MINERALS, Ch. 6 (1980); L. WELLS & D. SMITH, NEGOTIATING THIRD WORLD
MINERAL AGREEMENTS (1975); M. GILLIS, ENERGYs-4 CONTRACTS IN COLOMBIA, Appendices 2 and 5 (Report prepared for UNESCO, April 1980); and HOSSAIN, LAW AND POLICY
IN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT (1981); Tropical timber: M. GILLIS, FISCAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES IN TROPICAL HARDWOOD CONCESSIONS (to be published by United Nations
Center for Transnational Enterprises in 1982); and M. GILLIS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
FOREST-BASED SECTORS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION (Report prepared for FAO, United
Nations, 1981).
6. See M. GILLIS & R. BEALS, TAX AND INVESTMENT POLICY TOWARD HARD MINERALS 251 (1980).
7. See Mikesell, FinancialConsiderationsin Negotiating Mine Development Agreements, 134
MINING MAGAZINE 261, 263-264 (1974).
8. See GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 156-157.
9. See M. GILLIS, ENERGY CONTRACTS IN COLOMBIA 40-46 (Report prepared for
UNESCO, April 1981).
10. Id. Appendix 1.
11. Id. at 25-28.
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example of the breakthroughs that occurred during the seventies. As
explained in Section III, free equity represents one method of allowing
differential returns for host countries on deposits of differential quality.
Although this tool is not yet widely employed, demands for free equity
have become increasingly more common in resource negotiations underway in the early eighties. Countries that have already utilized free equity
as a tool for appropriating natural resource rents include Panama' 2 (copper
in 1976), Botswana 3 (copper-nickel in 1977) and Gabon 4 (uranium in
1979).
While these breakthroughs have attracted substantial attention to the
extractive industry worldwide, numerous sneakthroughs have gone little
noticed. In the long run, these sneakthroughs may have at least as significant an impact upon the division of resource rents between LDC
governments and extractive enterprises as the breakthroughs. A steady
shift, since 1960, away from specific (per unit) royalties and export taxes
to ad valorem levies on resources won provides an example of such a
sneakthrough. Measures taken in Bolivia in the early seventies for hard
minerals, Colombia in oil in the early seventies, 6 Indonesia for hard
minerals in 1970,17 Jamaica for bauxite in 1974, 8 and Papua New Guinea
and Indonesia for tropical timber in 1978-79"9 all exemplify this shift
away from specific royalties and export taxes. The LDC governments'
gradual abandonment of liberal tax incentives for investment in natural
resource extraction represents another significant sneakthrough. As proffered in the fifties and sixties, 2" such incentives included five to seven
year income tax holidays, full import duty (and often export duty) exemption for the life of the mineral project, exemption from withholding
taxes on repatriated profits, unlimited loss carryforward, percentage depletion allowances and very generous investment allowances carried over
beyond tax-holiday periods. Such privileges were commonly available to
12. GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 169.
13. See S. LEWIS, THE IMPACT OF THE SHASHE PROJECT ON BOTSWANA'S ECONOMY
6-10 (1979).
14. United Nations Secretariat, Center for Natural Resources and Transport, 3 NAT. RES. AND
ENERGY 1, 6 (1979).
15. M. GILLIS et al,, supra note 5, at 186-195.
16. GILLIS, supra note 9, at 4-5.
17. GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 47.
18. Gillis, McLure, The Incidence of World Taxes on Natural Resources with Special Reference
to Bauxite, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 389-393 (1975).
19. M. GILLIS, FISCAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES IN TROPICAL HARDWOOD CONCESSIONS 55-61 (to be published by United Nations Center for Transnational Enterprises in 1982).
20. For a summary of the types of incentives offered to natural resource firms in this period, see
Gillis, Bucovetsky, The Design of Mineral Tax Policy, and Gillis, Petersen, Wells, Issues and Policies
Related to Mining Tax Reform, in M. GILLIS et al., TAXATION AND MINING: NON-FUEL
MINERALS IN BOLIVIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES (1978).
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foreign investors in the fifties and sixties in Liberia 2' (iron ore), Philippines
(all hard minerals), Indonesia (copper), and such Francophone African
countries as Gabon, Niger and Chad. 22 By the early seventies, virtually
all developing countries had abandoned percentage depletion. Income tax
holidays for foreign investment in natural resources had begun to give
way either to reduced rates or corporate tax in the early years of operation
(Indonesia 23 ) or to guarantees of stable tax rates for specified periods
(Surinam, Ghana). By 1980, virtually no LDC governments outside of
former French African colonies offered tax holidays of any kind to natural
resource firms, domestic or foreign. A recognition that such devices served
primarily to confer major windfalls on stockholders of natural resource
firms, with little appreciable impact on enterprise investment decisions
and very limited benefits for host countries had emerged among LDCs.
Perhaps the most significant of the sneakthroughs has been the steady
growth in the capacities of many LDC governments for reducing the
scope for transfer-pricing abuses between affiliates of transnational firms.
These abuses entail two problems. Prices charged on affiliate transactions
not only do not reflect "arms-length" prices, but are so arranged as to
evade tax obligations to the host country. While not all TNCs have been
major offenders, the potential for host country losses from transfer-pricing
practices is considerable: in 1977 fully 95 percent of total exports by
large parent TNCs in petroleum were dispatched to their own affiliates;
in metals manufacturing, the proportion was 78 percent in TNCs with
24
more than half their production outside the enterprises' home country.
Through the sixties and into the seventies, manipulations of transfer
prices, on both inputs and outputs of natural resource TNCs, resulted in
significant understatement of taxable income in a wide variety of LDCs.25
Countries responded to such abuses in a variety of ways. Indonesia
and the Congo narrowed the scope for understatement of gross export
income by adopting posted-price systems for export of tropical logs.
Under these systems, both income and export taxes were assessed on the
21. See D. SMITH & L. WELLS, NEGOTIATING THIRD WORLD MINERAL AGREEMENTS, Ch. 3 (1975).
22. M. GILLIS, et al., supra note 5, Ch. 3.
23. Gillis, Beals, The Evolution of Indonesian Hard MineralAgreements, 4 NAT. RES. FORUM
341, 348-350 (1980).
24. J. STOPFORD, J. DUNNING, K. HABERICH, THE WORLD DIRECTORY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, XXIII, iii-xii (1980).
25. Measures to combat TNC transfer-price abuses (including transfer prices on capital) were
taken in Liberian iron ore, Chilean copper, Indonesian and Congolese tropical timber, Gabonese
uranium, and Libyan and Indonesian oil. On cases involving Liberian iron ore, Libyan and Indonesian
oil, see D. SMITH, L. WELLS, supra note 21, at 74-81. On Indonesian and Congolese timber,
see M. GILLIS, FISCAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES IN TROPICAL HARDWOOD CONCESSIONS, supra note 19, at Ch. 5. On Gabonese uranium, see Jolly, The Mineral Industry of Gabon,
MINERALS YEARBOOK 347-48 (1977).
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basis of the government's, rather than the companies', reading of world
market prices. In the mid-seventies, Bolivia and Colombia moved to
forestall under-invoicing of uranium concentrate exports by adoption of
methods gearing concentrate prices to readily observable international
market quotations. 2 6 Jamaica, in 1974, tied its ad valorem bauxite royalty
to the price of an internationally-traded downstream product (aluminum
ingot), because vertical integration in the six TNCs that dominated bauxite
mining meant that arms-length prices for the upstream product (bauxite)
were not then readily available anywhere in the world. A no less significant
LDC policy development in limiting transfer price abuses on capital
transfers was a trend toward imposition of limits on deductibility of
interest in the computation of net taxable income of foreign investors.
Large TNCs, particularly Japanese-based firms, had long been accustomed to manipulating the capital structure of their LDC subsidiaries so
as to overstate interest deductions, and thereby reduce host country taxes.
These firms accomplished this aim by providing finance from affiliated
firms, with a significant proportion of equity finance disguised as debt.27
Indonesia took steps to curtail this practice as early as 1968. In that
country's production-sharing contracts with foreign oil companies, all
interest of any kind was disallowed as a deduction.28 Measures taken
elsewhere, including the Indonesian hard-minerals sector, did not go
nearly so far, but merely disallowed deduction of interest paid to affiliates,
or established maximum debt-equity ratios above which interest was nondeductible.29
Thus, a substantial broadening and maturation of the array of fiscal
instruments that host countries may employ to capture rents from investments in natural resources has characterized the period since 1960.
As noted in a subsequent section, marked changes in the distribution of
resource revenues between host governments and investors have accompanied this trend. The new LDC fiscal regimes applicable to natural
resource investors provide for much more effective taxation of large
privately-owned TNCs than the regimes of twenty or even ten years ago.
B. Evolving Patterns of Investment in LDC NaturalResource Sectors
For the first decade and a half of the post-war period, American-based
private sector TNCs heavily dominated investment in LDC natural resource sectors, not only in oil and hard minerals, but in the rich tropical
forests of Insular Southeast Asia. The early domination of American firms
26.
27.
supra
28.
29.

See GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, Ch. 6.
For a detailed examination of this form of transfer-pricing abuse, see GILLIS & BEALS,
note 6, at 140-146.
SMITH & WELLS, supra note 21, at 77.
GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 139-144.
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resulted from their very substantial advantages in securing massive amounts
of capital and to the unique package of technological, management and
marketing skills American firms had managed to assemble. The position
of American-based firms in all international investment, including national
resources, began to erode substantially after 1960. Owing to the much
more rapid growth of investment by private European and Japanese-based
TNCs, 30 the U.S. share in direct foreign investment abroad had fallen to
45.5% by 1978, while the share of Japan and West Germany (combined)
rose from 4% to 16% between 1960-1978."' By the late sixties, privatelyowned TNCs from developed countries, including the United States,
Europe and Japan still accounted for an overwhelmingly large proportion
of investment in natural resource projects in LDCs. By 1980, however,
the emergence of three new types of other natural resource investors had
undermined significantly the dominant position of privately-owned TNCs
from developed countries. These included (a) state-owned TNCs from
developed countries, (b) private-sector firms from other developing countries, and (c) state-owned enterprises of the LDC host countries themselves.
State-owned natural resource TNCs from developed countries now play
major roles in natural resource extraction in LDCs, particularly in uranium, and to a lesser extent in oil. By 1980, no less than six large
European-based state-owned enterprises were active in uranium exploration in LDCs, where their investment activities since 1973 have surpassed those of their private sector counterparts in the United States.32
In oil, state-owned firms from France, Britain and Italy are among the
12 largest foreign investors in LDC petroleum extraction.
The activities of the other, newer type of investor in natural resources
have been expanding no less rapidly in recent years. The phenomena of
LDC-based firms investing in other LDCs has been particularly striking
in tropical timber: investors from other developing Asian countries are
responsible for well over half of foreign investment in tropical timber in
the three Insular Southeast-Asian nations of Indonesia, Malaysia and
Philippines. Together, these three countries account for nearly 80 percent
of world exports of tropical hardwood logs. In Indonesia alone, the world's
second largest producer in 1979, Philippine, Malaysian, and Hong Kong
firms were each responsible for more investment than American or Japanese TNCs. LDC-based TNCs in general accounted for 68% of total
30. Gillis, Multinational Corporations andA Liberal International Economic Order: Some Overlooked Considerations, in Amacher, Habeler, Willet, eds., CHALLENGE TO A LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 199-209 (1979).
31. STOPFORD, DUNNING, HABERICH, supra note 24, at XV.
32. Erickson, Gillis, High Level Enterprise and Low-Level Radioactivity: Two Hazards in LDC
Uranium Concessions, 6 J. OF ENERGY AND DEV. 44 (Autumn 1980).
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foreign investment in the Indonesian timber sector." The spread of LDCbased TNCs in natural resource investments extended beyond the timber
industry. Brazilian firms, including state-owned firms, have actively explored for oil, coal, and uranium in Colombia and other Latin American
countries, and several Mexican firms reportedly have begun to seek opportunities in hard-minerals mining in Central and South America.
Perhaps the most significant growth in natural resource investment in
LDCs since 1970 has resulted from the activities of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the host countries themselves. Some of the enterprises,
including Petrobras and CVRD of Brazil, Gecamines of Zaire, Codelco
of Chile, Centromin of Peru, PEMEX of Mexico, PERTAMINA of Indonesia and several others are among the 500 largest enterprises outside
the United States. State-owned firms play a particularly important role
in hard minerals mining sectors in many countries. Host country SOEs
account for 60% of hard mineral output in Indonesia, nearly 100% in
Zaire and Zambia, 80% of Brazilian iron ore exports, nearly two-thirds
of Bolivian mineral production, and one third of Korean mineral production. For Latin America as a whole, SOEs acting alone or in joint
venture arrangements with foreign firms will implement fully 70 percent
of planned investment in hard-minerals mining over the period 197934

85.

The evolution of the international oil industry since 1957 exemplifies
well the erosion of the once commanding position of developed country
TNCs in natural resource extraction in developing countries. In 1957,
nearly 90% of crude oil traded in world markets flowed through the
legendary "seven sisters" (seven major TNCs from developed countries).
By 1970, the share controlled by the seven had slipped slightly to 78%,
but by 1979, this share had fallen dramatically, to just under 24%. By
that year, fully 69% of crude oil traded on world markets was marketed
by state-owned oil companies from the producing countries themselves.35
Throughout the postwar period, both the design and implementation
of LDC tax policy in the natural resources area have been strongly influenced by host country desires to wrest larger shares of resource rents
from very large, private sector TNCs from the industrial countries. By
the seventies, many countries had begun to master the technology required
for effective taxation of such enterprises. But the growing importance of
newer types of investors in LDC natural resource endowments has created
33. M. GILLIS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN FOREST-BASED SECTORS OF THE ASIAPACIFIC REGION, Ch. 2 (Report prepared for FAO, United Nations, 1981).
34. Gillis, The Role of State Enterprises in Economic Development, 47 SOC. RESEARCH 251256 (Summer 1980).
35. Levy, World Oil Marketing in Transition, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs,
Working Paper 8-10 (May 1981).
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several novel tax issues for policy-makers there. These include problems
of taxation of smaller and perhaps more foot-loose TNCs from other
LDCs, the politically sensitive issue of taxation of state-owned TNCs
from Europe as well as other LDCs, and the difficulties involved in
capturing, through taxes and related devices, resource rents from host
country SOEs in natural resources. LDC systems of natural resource taxes,
developed primarily with an earlier type of investor in mind, may or may
not prove well suited to the evolving pattern of investment in LDC natural
resource sectors. Experience thus far furnishes little basis for judgements
on this issue.
II. EVOLUTION OF OBJECTIVES
Revenue considerations have traditionally had the most significant influence in molding LDC objectives in tax policy toward natural resource
endowments, although we shall see below that perspectives on revenue
objectives have altered substantially over the post-war era. But virtually
no LDC has sought revenue goals to the exclusion of other aims that
might be secured through natural resource taxation. Even in the fifties,
many countries were also employing resource tax policy to promote domestic processing of natural resources, and by the seventies several nations had begun to view tax policy as one means of controlling social
costs involved in resource extraction. This section traces the evolution
of these objectives, as exemplified by the experiences of several representative countries.
A. Taxes and Rent Capture
Stress upon revenue objectives of LDC natural resource tax policy
remains as strong in the 1980s as in the late fifties. Perspectives on
strategies for securing revenue objectives, however, have altered considerably over that period. Not two decades past, these revenue goals tended
to be expressed in relatively modest terms. This was primarily because,
as noted earlier, LDC officials viewed their bargaining position as decidedly weaker than those of the TNCs. There was thus a tendency to accept
contract arrangements that secured for the host country at least some share
of resource rents from exploitation of natural resources by the large TNCs
that then dominated resource extraction activity in LDCs. To a greater
extent than now, host country capture of benefits from natural resource
investment was largely dependent on tax policy,36 rather than other policy
instruments available to LDC governments. Indeed, non-tax benefits sought
by host countries, such as employment, regional development and transfer
36. See R. MIKESELL, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN COPPER MINING, XXI (1975) and
GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, Ch. 1.
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of technology tended to be relatively insignificant in most LDCs, owing
primarily to the marked capital intensity and import intensity of modern
extractive operations.
As LDCs gained both experience in dealing with large TNCs and the
capacity to operate more complex levies, revenue objectives began to be
stated in much more ambitious terms. In some countries, these objectives
were reflected in aggressive efforts to minimize TNC returns. These
measures were often successful in the sense of short-run revenue maximization, but disappointing in development of minerals sectors in countries adopting such policies. In other host countries, emphasis shifted to
the much sounder objective of optimizing net host country returns from
natural resource investments, not by any means the same thing as minimizing TNC profits, given the nature of market and geological risks
characteristic of natural resource exploration. By the eighties, a trend
toward emphasis on improving net host country returns, rather than minimization of TNC returns, was observable across a wide variety of countries.
For the 1980s, the rapidly growing role of state-owned host country
mineral enterprises may necessitate still another shift in emphasis toward
insuring that resource exploitation by state-owned enterprises yields at
least some tangible returns to the stockholder, i.e., the host government.
Experience thus far, from countries as diverse as Bolivia, Indonesia,
Zambia, Zaire, Turkey and Brazil does not strongly suggest that stateowned minerals enterprises will always act as responsible taxpayers, much
less act in the public interest at large. 37
Even by the mid-seventies, the changes in tax policy and tax administration sketched earlier had converted the natural resource sectors in a
number of LDCs into very significant revenue producers. Natural resources furnished between 5 and 15% of total central government receipts
in Thailand, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, Peru and the Philippines,
between 15% and 25% in Chile and Malaysia, in excess of 25% in
Ecuador, Mexico, Jamaica, Liberia, Zaire, and Zambia, and in excess
of 50% in Bolivia, Indonesia, Gabon, the Malaysian state of Sabah, Papua
New Guinea and New Caledonia.38
Recent measures for facilitating host country capture of resource rents,
described in the first section, have met with a considerable degree of
37. One of the classic cases of conduct by a state-owned natural resource enterprises inconsistent
with other government objectives was the Indonesian state oil company Pertamina in the period
1971-76. The enterprise accumulated over $10 billion in debt, on such dubious projects as insurance
companies, resorts, oil tankers and a steel mill. S. LIPSKY, THE BILLION DOLLAR BUBBLE
1-30 (1978). For other examples in other countries, see Gillis, The Role of State Enterprises in
Economic Development 47 SOC. RESEARCH 251, 256 (1980).
38. GILLIS et al., supra note 5, at 3; GILLIS, FISCAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES IN TROPICAL HARDWOOD CONCESSIONS, supra note 19, at 77.
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success, at least in terms of short-run revenue results. Except for uranium
in general, 39 and in such countries as Chile, where income tax rates on
new copper investments were reduced in 1980 to just under 50%, the
percentage share of host country taxes in the value of resource production
or in resource profits are now typically half again-and sometimes twicelevels common less than 25 years ago. This general increase indicates a
very marked tightening of terms available to investors. The oil industry
in particular has evidenced rising host country shares, even outside the
Mid-East OPEC producers. Host country shares in oil revenue have exceeded earlier expectations of even the more knowledgeable of international observers of foreign investment. In 1970, Vernon, a perceptive
analyst then and now, cautiously projected that host countries' shares of
profits in oil, never much more than 10-15 percent before 1950, seemed
"headed for a level in excess of 80% as a result of further concessions
squeezed out of the oil companies."' By 1980, however, host countries'
shares of profits in crude oil extraction had in numerous instances long
since surpassed 80%. Indeed, by 1980, governments in such relatively
small producing countries as Malaysia had managed to capture 80% of
the value of oil production, and the government's share in total profits
was 98.5%."' Even in countries such as Colombia that do not employ
windfall profits taxes or windfall royalties on oil, the government's share
in the value of oil produced approached 70% by 1980, while for many
other non-OPEC producers as well as OPEC member Indonesia, host
countries' shares of between 75 and 85 percent of value were common.42
Changes in taxation of tropical timber were bunched in the latter part
of the seventies, after decades in which host governments seemed to
overlook the sector as a source of tax revenue. Tax adjustments by Indonesia and the Malaysian state of Sabah (the two dominant producers)
in 1978-80 resulted in very sizeable increments in revenues. In both
jurisdictions, the share of taxes in gross value of timber exports doubled,
from 14 percent to 29 percent in Indonesia, and from 26 percent to 53
percent in Sabah."
The concept of retained value provides an alternative indicator of host
country shares of benefits from natural resource projects. Several studies
focusing on the division of benefits from foreign investment in hard
minerals extraction use the concept of retained value. 4 While the measure
39. Erickson, Gillis, supra note 32, at 40, 44.
40. VERNON, supra note 3, at 54.
41. GILLIS, supra note 9, Ch. 2.
42. Id, at 9-20.
43. Id., at 50-60.
44. See R. MIKESELL, supra note 36, Ch. 4; M. GILLIS et al., supra note 5; and GILLIS &
BEALS, supra note 6, Ch. 1.
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by no means represents a perfect method of assessing host country benefits
from such activity, movements in the ratio of retained value to gross
national resource exports are indicative of host country performance in
capturing larger shares of resource rent over time. Simply put, retained
value is defined as the total of all revenues from natural resource projects
retained in the host country, as for example in (1) below:
(1) RV = Wd + C + DP(I-Z) + Kd +Td + Qd
where:
RV = retained value
Wd = labor income for host country workers employed in natural
resource projects
Cd = proportion of income of expatriate workers spent locally
DP = domestic procurement of goods and services for natural resource projects
Z = import content of DP
Kd = capital income for domestic shareholders (including governments) in natural resource projects
Qd = miscellaneous payments received in host country
Retained value is itself a fraction of total proceeds (R) from natural
resource projects, where R is broken up into components as given in (2):
(2)

R = M + I + L + P + W, + U + RV

where:
M = cost of imports
I = interest cost on external loans and credits
L
loan repayments
P = profits remitted abroad
Wf= salaries of expatriates accruing abroad
U unidentified items
RV = retained value as defined in (1) above
The proportion RV/R, prior to the mid-sixties, was typically less than
50% in many LDCs with significant foreign investment in natural resources. For example, for Peruvian copper mining in 1960-65, retained
value represented only 30% of gross export proceeds in large projects
operated by foreign enterprises. 45 In Sierra Leone, retained value in the
foreign-owned mining sector in 1963-65 equalled only 43% of R, and
in Bolivian hard minerals in 1973-74 about 56% of gross mining revenues.46 In the Indonesian timber sector, retained value in the early sev45. MIKESELL, supra note 36, Ch. 4.
46. GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, Ch. 1.
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enties rarely exceeded 20% of reported gross timber export earnings.4 1
In all instances cited above, save Bolivia, foreign firms received one or
more forms of special tax incentives, usually in the form of income tax
holidays of five years or more.
The capital- and import-intensity of modern mining generally has meant
that the non-tax components of retained value were relatively small, and
that efforts to secure significant increases in retained value had, by necessity, to be focused on tax adjustments. Peru managed to increase
substantially the ratio of retained value to total copper exports from 30%
in 1960-65 to 50% in 1966-72, principally through higher taxes resulting
from renegotiation of its agreements with foreign firms. Indeed, in the
latter period, taxes accounted for just over 60% of retained value in the
largest Peruvian copper project.4" In both Bolivia and Sierra Leone, taxes
accounted for over 45% of retained value, and in West African tropical
forestry in the early seventies, taxes accounted for as much as 75% of
retained value in TNC forest projects.4 9 In Indonesian tropical timber
projects mounted by foreign enterprises in the late 1970s, very substantial
increases in export taxes and other fiscal levies resulted in a very sharp
increase in retained value, from less than 25 percent of gross export
earnings in 1975 to perhaps 50 percent by 1980.50
Although host country governments have achieved some success in
increasing their share of rents in natural resource projects involving large
privately-owned TNCs, the record with respect to their own state-owned
enterprises reflects rather mixed results. As a subsequent section indicates,
many host governments do not subject their state-owned natural resource
enterprises to all, or sometimes any, of the taxes and fiscal levies imposed
on foreign firms. Many governments that do attempt to tax their own
SOEs have often failed to administer the taxes effectively. Reluctance of
governments to apply the full range of fiscal instruments, developed to
tax foreign enterprise, to their own natural resource enterprises seems
incongruous. From the work of many analysts it is clear, certainly in the
case of foreign investment in extractive industries, that the major benefits
that host countries derive from such investment arise from government
tax revenues, and some maintain that the same observation may be no
less applicable to investments by host country state enterprises."
One reason for the apparent reluctance of governments to tax their own
47. M. GILLIS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE FOREST BASED SECTOR OF THE ASIA
PACIFIC REGION 81-90 (1981).
48. MIKESELL, supra note 36, Ch. 4.
49. GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, Ch. 1.
50. GILLIS, supra note 47, at 109-110.
51. MIKESELL, supra note 36, at XXI has been the leading advocate of the first view. Gillis,
in GILLIS et al., supra note 5, at 17-19 and in GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, Ch. 3 is associated
with both the latter view as well as that voiced by Mikesell.
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enterprise progeny may stem from the view that taxation of state-owned
firms represents nothing more than a "wash transaction": taxes on one
aspect of governmental operations (SOEs) are seen as mere reallocations
out of a common pool of resources available to the government. Proponents of this view contend that a government should be indifferent
between profits accumulating in natural resource SOEs or profits that flow
to the treasury in the form of taxes and dividends collected from the
SOEs. Elsewhere 2 the author and collaborators have argued that this view
is fundamentally unsound; that taxes on SOEs, particularly SOEs in natural resources, involve far more than mere "wash transactions." Indeed,
failure to adequately tax such enterprises may not only result in the
squandering by SOEs of large amounts of natural resource rents53 but
may adversely affect the management of SOEs through its effects on risktaking, factor choice and enterprise growth strategy." Fortunately, several
LDC governments have come to the same conclusion in recent years, as
shown below.
B. Taxes, Risk and Investment
As noted earlier, maximization of host country returns from natural
resource endowments does not necessarily imply minimization of returns
for mineral investors. In particular, governments that have restructured
resource taxes to yield the maximum tax revenue from existing projects
have often discovered that in doing so they may have precluded possibilities for new investments and consequently foregone sizeable tax revenues in the future.5 Resource tax systems designed with due attention
to the risks perceived by risk-adverse decision-makers in large mining
firms can, however, serve to increase significantly host country returns
at high levels of investment in exploration and development by minerals
enterprises. Specifically, tax systems that discourage development of marginal deposits comport neither with tax revenue maximization for governments nor with high levels of investment by extractive enterprises.
This point can be best understood by focusing upon two unintended
results of tax systems that involve the same fiscal treatment for all deposits
of a given resource. First, because profitability is, ceterus parabus, positively associated with size of reserves, such a system discriminates against
52. Gillis, Lessard, Jenkins, Public Enterprise Finance: Toward A Synthesis in L. JONES, R.
MALLON & R. VERNON, PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (to be
published 1982).
53. Dissipation of resource rents by LDC SOEs was particularly marked in Indonesia oil from
1971-76. (See LIPSKY, supra note 37, at 6-15) and in Bolivia before 1972 (See GILLIS et al.,
supra note 5, at 57-59).
54. GILLIS, LESSARD, JENKINS, supra note 52, at 453.
55. See Palmer, Mineral Taxation in Developing Countries: An Application ofResource Rent Tax,
27 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS, 517-530 (Sept. 1980).
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the development of smaller, marginal deposits. Marginal deposits, while
contributing little to investors' expected values, help reduce the variance
in the firms' rate of return-and reduce the risk premia they demand-.
by distributing exploration costs over a higher probability of successful
outcomes. 56 Application of this type of fiscal regime increases the variance
in the firms' rate of return, both by overtaxing small deposits and undertaxing large deposits. 57 This increased variance serves to increase the
operator's perceived risk and therefore his discount rate, thereby dampening exploration incentives. Potential surpluses available for taxation
are thereby diminished. In the end, both exploration investment and tax
revenues fall below levels possible under alternative systems of taxation,
yielding the worst of both worlds. Tax regimes which hinder the development of marginal deposits pose a particularly serious issue for resources
in which exploration costs constitute a major share of total extraction
costs, as in oil and gas. The effects of uniform taxation of all deposits
are less serious in the cases of coal and tropical timber, where exploration
costs-and therefore risks-have historically been a much smaller proportion of total costs.
In the late sixties and early seventies, most LDC petroleum tax structures applied uniformly across fields of all sizes. By 1980, many systems
had incorporated some form of differential taxation of fields of different
sizes, usually through use of higher taxes (or production shares) on successively higher levels of production. This adaptation resulted partly from
the recognition of the importance of minimizing contractor risk and partly
as a by-product of the implementation of taxes designed to collect resource
windfalls.
C. Taxes and Social Costs in Resource Extraction
Host governments in less developed countries have only recently begun
to consider systematically the social costs, or negative externalities, involved in any type of extractive activity. These costs include potential
damages to water tables, degradation of air quality, hazards to health and
safety involved in tailings disposal, and especially in tropical timber, the
effects of extraction on erosion, silting of waterways and on microclimatic
risks. Thus far, LDCs have used tax tools only sparingly in efforts to
control social costs associated with extraction. Indeed, the mining and
forestry codes of most LDCs are either largely silent on such issues or,
where provisions exist concerning requirements for reducing the scope
56. This well known proposition is demonstrated in some detail in Stauffer, Gault, Effects of
Petroleum Tax Design On Exploration and Development, AM. INST. OF MINING, METALLURGICAL, AND PETROLEUM ENGINEERS (1981).
57. Id., at 6.
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for such damages, penalties for non-compliance are rarely specified, and
even more rarely enforced. 8
The hazards appear greatest in uranium extraction and in the harvest
of tropical timber, but only in the timber industry have host countries
implemented fiscal measures for dealing with the problem. Uranium extraction involves significant environmental and health risks in the form
of long-term hazards from release of low-level radioactivity, primarily
from improper disposal of tailings from uranium mines and mills. 59 Not
only have host governments failed to impose higher taxes on uranium
and other radioactive substances to control and compensate for these costs,
but uranium agreements concluded over the period 1970-78 generally
involved fiscal provisions that, if anything, were less favorable to host
countries than those prevailing in base mineral agreements involving less
significant risks of substantial social costs.'
The situation is rather different in tropical timber, particularly among
the major producers in Southeast Asia. Recognition of environmental
risks associated with both selective and intensive cutting in natural tropical
hardwood forests, together with increasing emphasis on preservation of
the natural forest as an income producing asset, has led several Southeast
Asian nations and Brazil to enact a number of taxes, charges, deposits,
and incentives to promote reforestation and to finance land reclamation
and dredging activities in areas affected by erosion and silting.
A variety of tax measures similarly reflect growing concern for the
proper use and regeneration of timber resources. Brazil has employed for
years a system of liberal tax incentives for reforestation, involving tax
credits for qualified reforestation efforts. 6 Indonesia has adopted two
such fiscal devices since 1970. The first involved a special "additional"
timber royalty created in 1971, earmarked for financing the dredging of
silted rivers and for resettlement of persons affected by timber harvesting
projects. The second device, implemented in 1980, involves payment of
sizeable deposits per unit extracted (about 4% of export value). The
deposit is refundable only upon presentation of convincing evidence that
a serious program of reforestation is underway and is adequately financed. 62 The government of Peninsular Malaysia also employs a refundable deposit, substantially lower than the Indonesian levy, and a
system of earmarked charges amounting to about 3% of timber export
value to finance reforestation programs. The Malaysian state of Sabah
58. GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 203-207.
59. Erickson, Gillis, supra note 39, at 3.
60. United Nations Secretariat, supra note 14, at 4.
61. Staff of Extenso Rural, Tax Incentives for Reforestation, 14 DEVELOPMENT DIGEST 1923 (1976).
62. GILLIS, supra note 47, at 118-121.
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and the Philippine government also employ timber taxes earmarked for
reforestation purposes,
but with rates set well below those of Indonesia
63
and Malaysia.
D. Taxes and Domestic Processing
Host LDC governments have long used tax devices to encourage domestic processing of their natural resource endowments. As early as the
fifties, some East African countries employed much lower export tax rates
on sawn timber than on log exports. The objective of such measures is
of course to increase local value-added in the form of higher factor
payments to domestic labor and capital. For much of the period 195075, the view that more domestic processing of resources was always
economically advisable from the point of view of the host country prevailed widely both within LDCs and in the developed world. Development
strategies based on this view led to construction of a number of processing
projects that were either palpably uneconomic, or heavily skewed toward
interests of the foreign partner rather than the host country government. 64
Host governments may still, for political or other non-economic reasons, place strong emphasis on local processing of natural resource exports. By now, however, few examples exist outside of the tropical timber
industry of the use of special tax instruments as a means of encouraging
domestic resource-based industries. Whether because of the gradual spread
worldwide of modem techniques of project evaluation, bitter experience
from past crash programs to promote local processing, or generally growing sophistication in economic analysis in host countries, governments
now seem less inclined to plunge headlong into this activity before minimal local requirements for skills and complementary inputs have been
met. Thus, Indonesia in the mid-seventies briefly considered and then
abandoned the implementation of measures that would have yielded substantially lower export taxes on downstream products than for bauxite,
and lower taxes on exports of tin, copper and nickel ingot than on their
concentrates. The decision to forego the measures resulted from a demonstration showing that the system would impose rates of effective protection on domestic minerals processing
approaching 650 percent, a level
65
of protection that speaks for itself.
In tropical timber, however, the major producing countries began in
1978 to make more vigorous use of tax instruments, in conjunction with
log export quotas, to promote local processing. These measures have
63. GILLIS, supra note 19, at 99-107.
64. Palpably uneconomic processing projects included Bolivia's tin smelter, Colombia's petrochemical investments between 1965 and 1974, and Indonesia's steel mill.
65. Effective protection measures the protection afforded by government policies to value-added
in domestic processing. M. GILLIS & R. BEALS, supra note 6, at 22-24.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

been adopted even as large plywood mills and other wood-processing
firms in Japan, Korea and elsewhere have closed because of insufficient
log supplies and obsolete processing facilities. The Malaysian state of
Sabah imposes a royalty on sawn timber and plywood that, depending
on the case, is 1/4 or I/8 the amount of Sabah's royalty on logs. Papua
New Guinea imposes a 10% export tax on logs, but imposes no export
taxes on processed wood products. Finally, Indonesia imposes a 20%
export tax on logs, but only a 5% tax on sawn timber, and collects no
export taxes on plywood. In Indonesia, the differentiation of the timber
export tax structure results in rates of effective protection (protection to
domestic value added) of between 40 and 50 percent for sawmilling and
between 45 and 60 percent for other wood processing industries. 66 With
rates of effective protection of this magnitude, the Indonesian wood processing industry could operate at half the efficiency of foreign sawmillers
and plywood manufacturers and still remain competitive in the international market. Alternatively, the measures allow profitability of wood
processing to be as much as 50% higher in Indonesia than elsewhere,
and as much as 75% to 100% higher in Sabah than in Korea and Japan. 67
The incentives furnished by such manipulations of resource taxes are
therefore very substantial, as are the potential costs of inefficient investment.
III. EVOLUTION OF INSTRUMENTS
A. The Emergence of Windfall Taxes in LDCs: Implicationsfor Rent
Capture and Risk
Windfall taxes on natural resources, whether in the form of windfall
income taxes or windfall royalties (or excises, as in the United States)
belong in the family of "excess profits taxes" used widely since the turn
of the century in wartime, both in developed and developing nations. 68
Although generally applicable excess profits taxes have proven administratively unworkable in virtually every instance in which they have been
imposed, 69 a wide constituency of both academic authorities and LDC
decision-makers has come to view excess profits taxes confined to the
natural resource sector as useful tools for capturing economic rents from
exploitation of natural resources. The capital intensity of modem natural
resource extraction allows the application of the excess profits or windfall
taxes to a relatively small number of firms oriented to the export market.
66. GILLIS, supra note 47, at 86-88.
67. GILLIS, supra note 47, at 89-90.
68. Gillis, McLure, Excess ProfitsTaxation: Post-Mortem On the Mexican Experience, 32 NAT'L
TAX J. 501, 502 (1979).
69. Id., at 503.
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Tax authorities have greater access to the tax base in the export market
than to the tax base for non-traded goods because exports must pass
through easily monitored bottlenecks called ports. Thus, the windfall
resource taxes are at least in principle administerable at less than exorbitant costs to both government and investor. Inasmuch as host governments have historically derived little more than tax revenues from the
extraction of their resources, the taxes are therefore viewed as essential
for "automatically" assuring acceptable host country shares of the benefits
of such activity. Flat-rate taxes on corporate income and/or royalty rates
that are invariant with respect to minerals prices cannot perform this
function. If the flat-rate taxes are set high enough to yield sizeable tax
revenues on existing resource projects when world resource markets are
strong, they will tend to choke off new investment. If they are set low
enough to induce new investments, the host country will reap minimal
returns when unforeseen developments, as in world oil and uranium
markets in 1973 and 1978, send resource prices soaring or when deposits
of exceptional size and/or quality are discovered. Host countries have
therefore sought devices that would enable them to capture a substantial
share of rents that arise both from unforeseen developments in world
prices and from discoveries of particularly large or rich deposits, without
having to resort to the type of disruptive renegotiation or unilateral changes
in taxes that was not uncommon in the sixties and seventies. 70 Such
devices would be unnecessary only under conditions in which governments and investors have perfect knowledge concerning the future course
of world resource prices and where the location, extent and quality of
all future commercial deposits are known with certainty. Neither condition
obtains in reality.
Host countries have employed a wide variety of "automatic" instruments for rent capture. Some, as we shall note, are fairly well suited for
appropriating windfalls from unforeseen developments in world resource
prices (market windfalls) but not those arising from discovery of unexpectedly rich deposits. Others have been primarily designed to capture
rents from higher quality deposits (discovery windfalls) but tend to be
ineffective in generating additional tax revenues when prices increase
dramatically. Finally, a few of the devices are geared for capture windfalls
70. Demands by governments for renegotiation of natural resource contract terms and/or unilateral
changes in tax laws often, but clearly not always, lead to acrimonious conflicts between investors
and host governments in the sixties and seventies. In Indonesia, foreign oil contractors virtually
ceased exploration activities in 1977-78, following that country's alteration of basic contract terms
in 1976. Exploration investment returned to pre-1976 levels only in 1979. M. GILLIS & R. BEALS,
supra note 6, at 179. In Jamaica, several foreign TNCs in bauxite mining sharply reduced investment
in the industry following the government's 1974 decision to increase bauxite taxes by over 600%.
Gillis, McLure, The DistributionalImplications of The Taxation of Natural Resources, 61 RICE U.
STUD. 143, 161 (1975).
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arising from both sources. These devices are more difficult to administer
effectively. Some LDCs use a combination of methods to secure objectives
of windfall taxation. Among countries producing more than 100,000 bbls
of oil per day, Colombia appears to be the only nation that has refrained
from using any kind of windfall tax on oil, even though both coal and
uranium are subject to such taxes in that country. Not all methods have
proven to be fully effective, but their presence may at least be expected
to reduce the incidence of the type of acrimonious disputes over renegotiation of tax obligations so common in natural resource investment in
the late sixties and early seventies. Examples of such disputes include
Jamaica in bauxite in 1974, Papua New Guinea in copper in 1973 and
Indonesia in oil as late as 1976.
1. Instruments for Capture of Market Windfalls
Measures designed to capture market windfalls (excess "price" taxes)
have been adopted in recent years in a number of jurisdictions, including
Malaysia (oil and tin), Indonesia (coal), Peru (oil) and Sabah (timber).
This type of device affords one of the simplest forms of windfall tax,
and in the first instance involves the establishment of an indexed "basic"
oil (coal, tin, copper, etc.) price for a base year. The host nation then
imposes special tax rates over and above those ordinarily applicable upon
any excess of actual f.o.b. prices over the indexed basic price. The
Malaysian and Peruvian windfall taxes on oil furnish instructive contrasts
in the use of these devices. The Malaysian windfall tax, in operation
since 1977, results in windfall taxes of $13 per barrel at early 1981 prices
of $34 per barrel. 7' The Peruvian tax yields zero "windfall" revenues at
the same per barrel price. The Sabah progressive timber royalty imposes
a form of windfall tax on presumptive income per unit harvested. At very
low f.o.b. log prices, the royalty amounts to 30 percent of log value; at
very high log prices, the royalty approaches 57 percent of export value,
while at 1981 log prices, the royalty is about 40% of export value.72
2. Discovery Windfalls and Risk Minimization
Taxes on discovery windfalls have been utilized primarily in oil, occasionally in uranium and coal, and rarely in hard minerals and tropical
timber. In oil, profitability ordinarily rises with the size of the reserves.
The minimization of contractor risk as well as attainment of equity in the
revenue split between government and investor means that the government's share should rise with the size of reserves in any given field. Field
71. GILLIS, supra note 9, at 11-12.
72. M. GILLIS, FISCAL AND FINANCIAL ISSUES IN TROPICAL HARDWOOD CONCESSIONS, supra note 19, at 56-58.
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size, however, is unknowable at the outset of exploration. Even after
discovery, accurate determination of the amount of reserves contained in
a given petroleum deposit is problematical, even more so than in the case
of coal or uranium. Thus, policy-makers in the LDCs have found the use
of output (daily averages or annual averages) as a surrogate for reserves
to be expedient, notwithstanding problems involved in resorting to this
expediency. Oil contracts in such non-OPEC nations as Liberia, India,
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh all provide that contractor payments (or oil
deliveries) to governments increase with production from a particular
field.73 Among non-Mid-East OPEC producers, both Indonesia and Nigeria require higher taxes (and/or government shares) on larger fields than
on smaller fields.74 The systems used in all these countries represent one
of the ways of reducing contractor risks for a given value of government
benefits (taxes, royalties, production shares). Some tax parameters, be it
the income tax rate, the royalty rate, production bonus or, in productionsharing contracts, the production-sharing split, must vary according to
field size (or, in the absence of good information on field size, according
to output), if the reduction of contractor risk for a given value of government benefits is to be achieved.
Field size, however, is not the only determinant of "discovery windfalls" in existing contracts. Accessibility and deposit quality are often
equally important factors. Egypt's tax rates on off-shore drilling, for
example, vary in accordance to the accessibility of the field. Egypt attempts to extract a larger share of benefits from more accessible (less
costly) fields (those in water depths less than 200 meters) by inversely
varying the "tax rate" (government share of net production) according
to water depth and by allowing lower percentage deductions for contractor
cost recovery in more accessible fields. 75 Bolivia's uranium taxes vary in
accordance with both the size of recoverable reserves and the uranium
content of ore. Consequently, the government's share may range from
(after contractor
68% of net production for large, high quality deposits
76
cost recovery) to 32% for small, low-grade deposits.
3. Comprehensive Windfall Taxes
Some countries have eschewed the "market" and "discovery" forms
of windfall taxes on all or some of their resource endowments, preferring
73. For Liberia, the dividing line where higher taxes on a particular field come into force is
75,000 bbls/day (for the production bonus) and 100,000 bbls/day (for the income tax). For Bangladesh, the line is 100,000 bbls/day. In Sri Lanka, tax rates rise steadily as production increases
from 75,000 to 300,000 bbls per day. M. GILLIS, supra note 9, Appendix I.
74. For Nigeria, the government's share of net production of oil rises from 65% to 70% when
production surpasses 55,000 bbls/day from any one contractor.
75. GILLIS, supra note 9, Appendix I.
76. GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 234.
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to utilize a single tax device for capture of windfall income of both types.
These include Colombia (coal and uranium), Papua New Guinea (copper
and oil) and Indonesia (hard minerals). These instruments, labeled in
some guises as "resource rent" taxes, share a common feature. They are
all imposed on enterprise returns above some threshold or "normal" rate
of return chosen by the host government. These devices therefore amount
to taxes on profitability rather than on profits per se. Differences in the
way different countries define tax bases render difficult any comparisons
between the different forms of comprehensive windfall taxes and between
the comprehensive and the other forms of windfall taxes. Illustrations
from Colombia and Indonesia demonstrate the point quite effectively.
These illustrations also indicate some major pitfalls in the design and
implementation of windfall taxes. The apparent bases of the comprehensive windfall taxes ae similar in both countries: the base is total capital
invested.
The Colombian windfall tax on coal applies only when the contractor's
return on accumulated investment exceeds 35%.77 The Indonesian windfall tax on hard minerals is imposed only in those years in which the
contractor's return exceeds 15% of total capital. The Colombian tax thus
appears to be substantially more lenient towards the foreign investor than
the Indonesian tax. In fact, the ultimate differences between the two
windfall taxes are more apparent than real: neither will apply except at
very high rates of return to foreign shareholders.
The two taxes are in fact quite similar in terms of their ultimate impact
on investors, aside from differences in the depreciation of the asset base
upon which windfall returns are computed. The Colombian tax takes
effect when enterprise returns before income taxes exceed 35% of total
capital; the Indonesian tax applies in years when enterprise returns after
income taxes exceed 15%. The Colombian tax rate on repatriated profits
is 52% (40% on non-repatriated profits). Thus, the 35% return at which
windfall taxes apply in Colombia is comparable to an 18.2% after-tax
return in Indonesia. In other words, the windfall tax will apply in Indonesia for all after-tax returns above 15%, and in Colombia for aftertax returns above 18.2%. The marginal tax rate applicable to returns in
excess of the threshold rate is a flat 60% in Indonesia, while the Colombian
windfall tax rate rises from 2% for excess profits of less than $1 million
to 90% for excess, or windfall, returns of about $124 million per annum.
At first glance, both taxes appear to represent reasonable and effective
methods of capturing for the government sizeable shares of windfall
income from natural resource projects. These taxes seem reasonable par77. Carbones de Colombia, Intercor, ContratodeAssociation ParaArea B Del Cerrejon: Projecto
del Carbon (Bogota, Enero de 1977), clausula 16.
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ticularly because they come into play at rates of return near or only slightly
above those prevailing for large U.S. mining and crude oil producers in
the period 1971-80. For the period 1971-75, rates of return on stockholder equity for mining and crude oil producers among Fortune's 500
equalled 15.6%; for the period 1976-80, the figure was 15.3%. 78 The
windfall taxes are computed, however, on the basis of returns to total
capital invested (debt plus equity capital). Thus, neither the Colombian
7ar the Indonesian windfall taxes as they are now structured will apply
until total returns on equity are a substantial multiple of 15% (Indonesia)
and 18.2% (Colombia). This result obtains because both the Indonesian
and Colombian threshold rates of return, as properly interpreted, apply
to corporate profits after both taxes and interest are subtracted. Corporate
profits thus defined represent funds available to equity owners. Thus, the
critical windfall rate of return (threshold rate) depends on the debt-equity
(D/E) ratio. In natural resource projects in developing countries, D/E
ratios of 3:2 to 3:1 and higher are not uncommon for American-based
firms. D/E ratios of 4:1 and even 6:1 are not rare for Japanese firms
operating in LDCs. If equity equals 50% of total capital (i.e., a D/E ratio
of 1:1), then a 15% return on total capital as calculated for purposes of
the Indonesian tax implies a 30% return on equity. At a more common
D/E ratio of 3:2, a 15% return on total capital corresponds to a 37.5%
return on equity.80 Returns on equity approaching or surpassing 40%
therefore escape payment of windfall taxes in both countries. Returns of
78. Worthy, The Fortune 500 for 1980, 103 FORTUNE MAGAZINE, 323, 328 (1981).
79. See GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, Ch. 2.
80. A simplified example, due to Ralph E. Beals, illustrates the point. Ignoring any revaluation,
total capital invested (TC) is defined as in (I) below.
(1) TC = TA- CL
total assets
where TA
current liabilities
CL
Total capital can also be seen as (2):
(2) TC = D + E
where D = long-term debt
C = equity
Therefore, returns on equity ( ) and returns on total capital invested are related by (3) below:
Tr
D+E
( E
where tr= corporate profits after taxes and interest on debt. Thus, if E
E) (i.e., when the debt/equity ratio is 3:2):

7r

(3)

(4)

-=2.5(
E
IT

0:40 (D +

)

D+E)

IT

= 15%, then: - = 37.5%
E
D+E
This says that a 15% return on total capital invested is equivalent to a 37.5% return on equity, when
the debt-equity ratio is 3:2. At a still higher debt-equity ratio, the return on equity, for any given
IT, will of course be higher.
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this magnitude rarely exist anywhere in the world, in or outside natural
resource projects, and where found are ordinarily transitory. Nevertheless,
most comprehensive windfall resource taxes now in force employ "threshold" rates of return in excess of 15% of total capital invested.
In sum, countries that have employed the simpler forms of windfall
taxes on resources (those imposed on market windfalls and discovery
windfalls) appear more likely to capture significant shares of rent from
natural resource projects than nations that have utilized the more sophisticated comprehensive windfall taxes that utilize total capital as the basis
upon which windfall returns are computed. The resource rent tax in oil
adopted by Papua New Guinea, and an earlier tax applied there to a large
copper project, appears largely immune from this criticism. Those taxes
are applied once a certain threshold return on total cash flow, rather than
total capital, is realized. 8
B. Taxation of State-Owned Natural Resource Enterprises
It is patently clear that it would be unsound for such nations as Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia to automatically reinvest the entirety of their oil earnings
in the respective oil sectors of those nations. For that reason, neither
country leaves more than a small fraction of surpluses from oil exports
in the hands of state oil enterprises, to be spent in the oil sector at the
discretion of the firms. The rents, or surpluses, generated within stateowned natural resource enterprises constitute important sources of national savings in all countries that have created such enterprises. These
savings are ordinarily viewed as the basis for financing broad development
efforts across economic sectors, from agriculture through industry and
transport as well as natural resources. The use of natural resource endowments for the benefit of the economy as a whole, rather than for the
benefit of much narrower constituencies closely associated with the SOEs
themselves, requires explicit mechanisms for transfer of surpluses of
natural resource SOEs to the national treasury proper. Absent these mechanisms, LDCs run the risk that surpluses available from exploitation of
scarce natural resources will be inefficiently invested in marginal natural
resource projects, squandered in activities unrelated to natural resource
extraction and processing, or diverted to the personal fortunes of enterprise managers and their political supporters.
Before 1970, the perils associated with the lack of explicit mechanisms
for transfer of SOE surpluses to national budgets were not widely recognized within LDCs or developed countries. Reports of bitter experiences over the past two decades with financial excesses and/or ill-advised
81. Palmer, supra note 55.
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investments 82 in state-owned natural resource enterprises in oil (Indonesia,
1971-76; Colombia, 1965-75) and hard minerals (Bolivia from 1951-71,
Ghana from 1960-78) have led many LDCs to alter their tax policies toward
their SOEs. A growing number of LDCs now subject state-owned natural
resource enterprises to the same kinds of fiscal regimes applied to foreign
firms.83 Several others have tightened fiscal rules applied to SOEs in order
to insure that natural resource rents are not dissipated in activities of very
low national priority. Different nations employ different mechanisms for
effectuating transfer of such surpluses. A few nations have utilized, with
little success, formal and informal provisions wherein all or part of SOE
operating surpluses are consolidated into overall income of the national
treasury, e.g., Bolivia. In a few others, e.g., Indonesia and Pakistan, the
SOEs pay "dividends" to the state-as-stockholder on the basis of a predetermined, legislatively established rate that is intermittently enforced. Most
countries84 employ taxation as the primary tool for capturing some share of
SOE rents for the economy as a whole. Some LDCs require their natural
resource SOEs to pay generally applicable royalties.85 Only a few are fully
exempt from generally applicable income taxes,86 while a somewhat larger
number benefit from special income tax credits not available to privatelyowned natural resource enterprises. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that, with
few exceptions, LDCs generally subject natural resource SOEs to lighter
tax and tax-like obligations than those applied to private firms in LDC natural
resource sectors. No country attempts to appropriate 100% of rents generated
in SOEs: typically, the systems employed leave 40 to 50 percent of profits
in the hands of the enterprises themselves, to be used for reinvestment in
the natural resource sectors or for other purposes.
Table 1 provides a thumbnail sketch of the methods for surplus transfer
in oil, coal, uranium, hard minerals and tropical timber in ten developing
countries.
C. Tax-Like Devices: "Free" Equity
Over the past two decades, natural resource agreements between LDC
host countries and large TNCs have increasingly come to involve equity
participation by the host government or by its citizens. The large scale
of investments in modern natural resource projects has generally meant
that equity-sharing in practice has been tantamount to purchase of shares
by the host government, given the scarcity of private LDC investors with
sufficient capital to enter into large-scale joint ventures with foreign firms.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See notes 53 and 63, supra.
See Table I, Col. 1.
See Table 1, Col. 3.
See Table 1, Col. 2.
See Table 1, Col. I.
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TABLE I
Summary of Methods of Surplus Transfer: State-Owned
Natural Resource Enterprises in Developing Countries
Country and Enterprise

A. Oil Sector
I. Argentina (YPF)
2. Bolivia (YPFB)
3. Brazil (Petrobras)
4. Colombia (Ecopetrol)
5. Indonesia (Pertamina)
6. Malaysia (Petrobras)
7. Mexico (Pemex)
8. Pakistan (3 firms)
B. Coal Sector
I. Colombia (Carbocol)
2. Indonesia (Batubura)
C. Uranium Sector
I. Bolivia (Coboen)
2. Colombia (Coluranio)
D. Non-Fuel Minerals
1. Bolivia (Comibol)
2. Indonesia (2 firms)
3. Mexico (several firms)
4. Pakistan (PMDC)
5. Zaire (Gecamines)
E. Tropical Timber
1. Indonesia (Inhutani)

(1)
Subject to generally
applicable host
country income tax
or to special
income taxes?

yes
no
yes (special tax)
yes
(special tax credits)
yes (special tax)
yes
no

(2)
(3)
(4)
Subject to
Subject to
production required diviand/or
dend payout Subject to
export taxes
from aftercustoms
or royalties? tax income?
duties?

n.a.
no
n.a.
partially
no
no
yes
(two taxes)
n.a.

no
no
no

no
no
no

yes

partially

yes
(special deductions)
yes

no

no

partially

no

yes

partially

no
no

no
no

no
no

no
no

no
yes
yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

no
yes
no
yes
n.a.

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

n.a. information not available
Source: Malcolm Gillis, "Methods for Transfer of Surpluses from State-Owned Oil and Mining
Enterprises: Taxation and Related Devices in Several Countries" (Report prepared for United
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporation, New York, July 1980).
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While the economic benefits of host country purchase of equity shares
are easily overstated, there are often strong noneconomic arguments for
equity sharing that often override any commercial considerations in the
decision, both from the point of view of the host country and the TNCs.87
Beyond purchase of equity in natural resource projects, many LDCs
are turning to a different policy on ownership. They are insisting, at the
outset of negotiations with foreign natural resource firms, on "free" shares
for the government. Receipt of "free" equity by host governments amounts
to taxation under another label. In some cases, host governments obtain
the "free" shares prior to the beginning of the project, as compensation
for the government's granting of rights to mine or to cut timber in government-owned deposits. The large copper projects undertaken during the
mid-seventies in Botswana and Panama provide examples of such an
arrangement. The governments of Botswana and Panama received, respectively, 15 percent and 19 percent "free" equity at the outset. A major
uranium project in Gabon also involved free equity.88 In other cases,
governments have agreed to "pay" for the shares out of future dividends, 8 9
an arrangement that is equivalent to securing "free" shares at a later date,
since the government puts up no money at the outset.
Demands for "free equity" now often comprise a major component in
sophisticated bargaining strategies of host countries. In these strategies,
"free equity" plays a significant role in efforts to capture differential
resource rent from higher quality deposits, and in efforts to reduce the
burdens on host country officials charged with negotiation of natural
resource agreements. Increasingly, LDC governments have sought to
leave only a single major element of the fiscal and financial package in
such agreements variable and subject to negotiation. If none of the fiscal
terms are variable, then the host government cannot levy heavier charges
on the more economically attractive deposits than on lower quality sites.
Conversely, if all fiscal terms (income tax and royalty rates, nature of
income tax deductions, "free" equity) remain variable and subject to
negotiation at one time, providing negotiators with coherent guidelines
and even comparing one set of terms with another become virtually
impossible. In many cases, 9 ° governments have found it convenient to
limit negotiations to the percentage of "free" equity to be supplied by
the foreign firm. Low quality, inaccessible deposits yield low or zero
87. For a discussion of the economic and political arguments, pro and con, of purchased equity
in natural resource projects, see Gillis, Wells, Negotiating and Implementing Minerals Agreements
with Multinationals: Some Critical Tax and Developmental Issues in M. GILLIS & R. BEALS,
supra note 6, at 163-166.
88. GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 167-170.
89. SMITH & WELLS, supra note 21, at 135.
90. M. GILLIS & R. BEALS, supra note 6, at 168-169.
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share of "free" equity; particularly attractive deposits or timber stands
give rise to substantial scope for "free" equity.
D. ContractualFrameworkfor Resource Taxation
Taxes on foreign operations in natural resources in LDCs until very
recently have been imposed almost exclusively in the framework of special mineral agreements with extractive enterprises. 9 The dissimilarity
between natural resource activities and industrial and agricultural undertakings, the size of the revenues potentially realizable from natural resources relative to other investments, and generally weak income tax
administration, have ordinarily precluded subjecting natural resources
investments to generally applicable tax legislation. Rather, the host countries typically have relied on special concession agreements providing
terms and regulations specific to particular investments. The pattern is
slowly changing: by 1980 natural resource agreements governing entry
terms in a wide variety of LDCs had come to involve much less reliance
on mine or deposit-specific provisions and much more on laws of general
applicability. Thus, Indonesian hard mineral agreements of the late sixties
provided for special rules for computing taxable income and special rates
of income tax applicable to mining. Provisions relating to income taxes
in more recent (post 1972) mineral agreements, however, involved much
more frequent reference to rules pertaining to generally applicable taxes
on income in Indonesia.9 2 Oil agreements in Colombia in the late fifties
contained detailed references to special tax provisions applicable to foreign oil companies. By 1981, fiscal terms of oil contracts in that country
specify only that foreign enterprises are subject to prevailing taxes on
income and remittal of profits. Uranium agreements and service contracts
in coal concluded in that same country make no mention of enterprise
income tax obligations at all; 93 the applicability of general income tax
laws appears to be taken for granted.
Although there is a clear trend, made possible by gradual maturation
of LDC tax systems and tax administrations, away from reliance on special
contracts and toward general laws in relations with foreign natural resource firms, specialized contractual forms remain, in most countries,
essential for dealing with the special characteristics of natural resource
extractive activity. The two most widely prevalent contractual forms now
in use are contracts-of-work and production-sharing contracts. Service,
or management contracts are found in an isolated number of projects, as
91. Special contracts vs. general law in mining agreements were the rule until the early to middle
seventies. SMITH & WELLS, supra note 21, at 27-37.
92. GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 124-126.
93. GILLIS, supra note 19, at 8-15.
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in the Colombian coal sector, but true service contracts in natural resources
are still relatively uncommon outside of Latin America.
There is a widespread view within developing countries that productionsharing contracts are inherently superior to contracts of work as a vehicle
for extracting resource rents for the host country." To be sure, significant
differences exist between the two formats governing mineral investment.
The basic difference between the two contract formats (as used in practice)
is essentially a political one: under production-sharing contracts, title to
all natural resources remains clearly in the hands of the host government
until after the government splits production with the foreign contractor.
In the case of contracts-of-work (as employed in most countries) title to
the resources may be vested in the foreign firm. Alternatively, the contracting parties may deliberately allow the terms dealing with title to
remain vague. Firms may then represent to banks and other potential
leaders that title belongs to the firms, and governments may represent to
the public that "rights" to the resources have not been "awarded" to
foreigners.
No significant economic differences exist between the two formats,
however. Nevertheless, early examples of production-sharing contracts
(circa 1967-70) seemed to involve greater fiscal benefits to host countries
than contracts of work and more traditional "concession" contracts long
employed in LDCs. This spawned a mythology concerning the "superiority" of production-sharing contracts (PSCs). Specifically, some observers have maintained that production-sharing contracts (PSCs) are not
only easier for host countries to monitor, but that the structure of production-sharing arrangements involves inherent advantages not found in
other contract formats.95 No factual basis supports the imputation of any
special degree of effectiveness to either of the two formats, insofar as
fiscal benefits to host countries are concerned.
In general, the contract-of-work essentially provides that the foreign
firm is considered as a contractor in the employ of the owner of the
property right in the resource (the LDC government). The contractor pays
income tax on his profits, plus any royalties and other generally applicable
taxes. Under classic forms of PSCs, as used for example in Malaysian
and Indonesian oil and Bolivian uranium, the government allows the
contractor a share in the net production, where net production is defined
as gross production minus allowable contractor costs in extracting the
resources.
Government-contractor splits in net production in the oil business,
where the PSC is most widely used, are usually geared to the level of
94. These views are analyzed in GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 126-131.
95. See GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 132.
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daily production. Typical splits range from 65:35 (India) through 70:30
(Malaysia) to 76:24 (Bangladesh) at low levels of production to 80:20
and even 92:8 (Sri Lanka) at high levels of productivity with governments
always receiving the greater share.96 Governments normally may take
their share of the split in kind or in cash.
Production-sharing provisions amount to tax arrangements by another
name. Any economic differences between PSCs and contracts-of-work
insofar as host country taxes are concerned are not inherent, but merely
reflect decisions made by governments regarding the basic parameters
governing the charges imposed on firms. That is to say, governments may
easily adjust income tax rates and royalties under contracts-of-work to
achieve the same financial results as changes in production share under
a PSC.97
Nor are PSCs any more or less difficult to administer than income taxes
used to extract resource rents under contracts-of-work. Under both contract formats, LDC tax officials must still insure that the contractor does
not understate gross income nor overstate costs. Thus, care in verifying
net income of natural resource enterprises is no less essential under PSCs
as under contracts of work.
There is, however, one sense in which PSCs are inferior to contracts
of work where foreign enterprises are involved. Under contracts-of-work,
host country income taxes paid by the contractor are clearly creditable
against home country income taxes, while royalties are deductible. Taxes
paid in the form of production shares to host country governments, however, cannot always be credited against home country income tax liabilities, but may be merely deductible.9 8 Tax credits are substantially more
valuable to the enterprises than deductions. Therefore, TNCs, particularly
American and Japanese-based firms, strongly prefer in most cases that
the taxes they pay to host country governments be creditable, not deductible, against home country taxes. Permitting resource taxes to be
creditable in home governments to the maximum extent possible benefits
the host government, by allowing a higher level of enterprise profits at
no sacrifice to the host government levying the taxes. The U.S. Treasury,
quite naturally, views host country manipulations of taxes designed to
maximize creditability as devices for "picking Uncle Sam's pockets." In
sum, differences between the two most widely employed contract formats
in LDC minerals sectors amount to little more than differences in labeling.

96. See GILLIS, supra note 9, Appendix 1.
97. See GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 130-132,
98. GILLIS & BEALS, supra note 6, at 130.

